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The Public Interest Derivative Suit:
A Proposal for Enforcing Corporate
Responsibility
Howard M. Friedman
Taking an overview of the historical development and current status
of the law governing corporate behavior, the author makes an unorthodox
proposal for a new method of enforcing federal standards of corporate
responsibility - the public interest derivative suit. The author begins
with a brief discussion of the elusive concept of "corporate responsi-
bility." After describing the demise of both shareholder and state con-
trol over corporate activity, the author traces the development of the
federal law of corporate responsibility. He then challenges the ability
of existing groups to enforce this evolving law, and concludes that the
public interest derivative suit is essential to the proper enforcement of
the federal law.
I. INTRODUCTION
E WO AUTOMOBILES can be used to illustrate the develop-
ment of American thought concerning corporate responsibility.
The classic free-market concept was judicially enshrined in Ameri-
can case law in 1919 in Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co.1  HenryTHE AUTHOR: HOwARD M. FIEDMAN or intituted a wage and
(B.A., Ohio State University; J.D., Har- Foru ins e
vard University; LL.M., Georgetown price policy that was directed
University) is an Associate Professor of toward maintaining but not
Law at the University of Toledo and is
admitted to the Ohio Bar. His teaching maximizing shareholder profit
specialities include Corporate Finance in order to increase employ-
and Securities Regulation. ment at good wages and re-
duce the price of his Model T
to the public.' The court's reaction was:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.3
In 1965, using the General Motors Corvair as his primary ex-
1204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
2 See H. FoRD & S. CRowIkmit, MY LF AND WoRK 159-64 (1922).
3204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919),
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ample, Ralph Nader focused the attention of the public on corporate
responsibility to consumers by exposing corporate indifference to
automobile safety.' The courts have yet to fashion an adequate
response to this new concern.'
In recent years, corporations have increasingly undertaken proj-
ects to meet the social responsibilities that corporate management
has identified.' But corporations have encountered some difficulty
in attempting to reconcile these projects with what are thought to
be legal duties to shareholders to maximize profits. Often the justi-
fication offered is that the activity does maximize profits, either in
the short or long run, or that the activity prevents public or govern-
mental reaction that would impair future profit making potential8.
Occasionally, corporate activities are justified by management in
terms of broader social responsibilities;9 even less often, courts
justify corporate activities in these terms.1"
The basic and unchanged structure of American corporate law
has, however, been one of accountability of management to share-
holders for their interests qua shareholders." Little real progress
4 R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
5 Compare Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) with
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966).
6 See generally N. CHAMBERLAIN, BUSINESS AND TE CrrIEs (1970); J. COHN,
THE CONScINcE OF THE CORPORATIONS 4-7 (1971); CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA. (R. Nader & M. Green ed. 1973).
7See J. COHN, THE CONScIENcE OF THE CORPORATIONS 4-7 (1971).
8 Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REV. 157,
158-66 (1970).
9 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TEL & TEL CORP. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 23: "The
year 1970 brought a spreading awareness of the social/environmental responsibility of
all segments of society, including business. ITr has been a pioneer in recognizing and
fulfilling this responsibility .. "
10 The leading example is A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d
581, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 346 U.S. 861 (1953):
"It seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when corporations were originally
created required that they serve public as well as private interests, modern conditions
required that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private respon-
sibilities as members of the communities within which they operate." 13 N.J. at 154,
98 A.2d at 586; and Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th cir. 1972):
"In this case we have a corporation engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metro-
politan newspaper, whose obligation and duty is something more than the making of
corporate profits. Its obligation is threefold: to the stockholders, to the employees and
to the public." See also State ex rel. Sorensen v. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R., 112 Neb. 248,
199 N.W. 534 (1924). Cf. Blumberg, supra note 8, at 173-78.
" The possibility of a shareholder backlash to the increasing social conscience of
corporate management cannot be overlooked. See the shareholder proposal in the 1972
proxy statement of Westinghouse Electric Corp.
RESOLVED: That the Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation be amended
by adding thereto the following provisions: "No corporate funds of this cor-
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has been made in identifying nonshareholder interests for which man-
agement is responsible. Even courts that have gone the farthest in
articulating a social responsibility of corporate management have
not suggested that this responsibility is one that can be enforced by
any interested party. 2 Rather, the clear trend has been one of al-
lowing management to be socially responsible if it so desires (with
limited accountability to shareholders) or, to ignore social responsi-
bility if it so prefers (with accountability to no one for its inaction).
This article will attempt to outline a method for defining and en-
forcing the responsibility of corporate management to non-share-
holder interests.
II. THE NOTION OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Traditional Theory of Management Responsibility
The notion that management's undivided obligation is owed to
shareholder interests arose from certain economic assumptions that
are no longer valid. Traditionally, the corporation was viewed as a
device for seeking out capital. Thus, in 1927, Professor Ballantine
was able to write:
Much of the industrial and commercial progress of the 19th and
20th centuries has been made possible by the corporate mechan-
ism.... By its use men may combine their capital and participate
in vast business enterprises with a risk limited to the capital con-
tributed and without peril to their other resources and business.
The amount of capital needed for modern business could probably
be assembled and combined in no other way. 13
Capital cannot be attracted unless sufficient profits are generated to
pay investors the rate of return they demand.14  When accumula-
potation shall be given to any charitable, educational or other similar organi-
zations, except for purposes in direct furtherance of the business interests of
this corporation and subject to the further provision that the aggregate amount
of such contributions shall be reported to the shareholders not later than the
date of the annual meeting."
Management responded, in part, that: "It is especially important that Westinghouse be
a leader in meeting citizenship responsibilities in the communities in which it operates."
12 Indeed, the court in A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581,
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), did
not even suggest that "modern conditions" created an affirmative legal requirement that
corporations discharge social responsibilities, much less that such a requirement could
be enforced by non-shareholders.
Is H. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1 (1927).
14 Our accounting systems, however, do not reflect certain costs which ought to be
borne by the corporation. Thus profit figures do not reflect the costs of pollution, in-
jury, and human dislocation. B. MISHAN, GROWTH: THE PRIcE WE PAY (1969);
Parker, Accounting and Ecology: A Perspective, J. AcCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1971, at 41.
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ion of capital was the critical economic need, the most desirable
allocation of resources was one that attracted investment. Be-
cause the shareholder, as the ultimate supplier of capital, had to be
satisfied at all costs, management's responsibility was traditionally
owed to the shareholder.15
In the large modern corporation, however, the stockholder-king
retains only a shadow of his former power. His importance to the
corporation has diminished; he has lost interest in exercising power
and his subjects have removed from him many of the tools of effec-
tive control. The capital-seeking function of the corporation has
declined in importance. A large part of what Professor Berle term-
ed "the twentieth-century capitalist revolution" was the freeing of
corporations from the judgment of the financial markets through
the use of internally generated capital.' 6 Professor Galbraith re-
fined this concept as he described the industrial planning techniques
that permit capital formation without reliance upon competitive cap-
ital markets. Even where recourse is had to the capital markets,
the corporation has other options available. For example, capital
funds ordinarily allocated for dividend purposes may be retained in
the business."
As the importance of the shareholder to the corporation has de-
creased, so has the shareholder's interest in the corporation. The
increasing liquidity of the securities market coupled with the treat-
ment accorded to capital gains under the Internal Revenue Code
led the typical shareholder to vote with his feet - or more appro-
priately, with his broker.' Particularly when the opportunity to
1 5 See A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 333-39 (1933). See also Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility,
26 Bus. LAw. 533, 538 (1970):
There seems to be no overriding necessity for either encouraging or discour-
aging activity which might appear to be nonprofit oriented. If in fact, any
corporation behaves uneconomically, the market will take care of it. It will
either go bankrupt or control will be transferred to someone who will manage
the corporate funds differently.
16See A. BERLEI, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35-42
(1954). But cf. Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOcIETY, 166, 177-90 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
17J. GALBRIATH, THE NEW INDUSTRAL STATE, 35-45 (1967).
lS Cf. Brittain, Federal Tax Laws and Corporate Dividend Behavior, 28 OHIo ST.
L.J. 427 (1967).
19 Even the large institutional investors, who have the greatest incentive to control
management activity, generally dispose of their holdings rather than give battle. See
5 SECURITIES AND ExCHAiNGE COMMIssION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY RE-
PORT 2749-70 (1971); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers
and Corporate Responsibility, 21 STAN. L REV. 248, 263-66 (1969); Rostow, To
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sell one's holdings would result in a profit - as has generally been
the case since World War II - selling is usually more appealing
than attempting to turn management around2
Finally, legal obstacles to shareholder supervision of manage-
ment have increased, and self-perpetuation has virtually become the
norm. Management's control over proxy solicitation machinery,21
including access to the corporate treasury to finance solicitations,22
has imposed formidable burdens upon the shareholder who wishes
to mount a challenge. In nearly six thousand meetings for the elec-
tion of directors held in the 1970 fiscal year by companies subject
to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proxy solicita-
tion rules, proxy contests occurred in only 24 cases, and manage-
ment emerged victorious more often than did insurgents. 3 This in-
dicates that the enormous cost of compliance with the federal proxy
rules does not generally make battle worthwhile.
The SEC's shareholder proposal rule,2 4 while often touted as
promoting shareholder democracy, 2 is so limited that it can hardly
be taken as a serious attempt to subject management to shareholder
supervision. In excluding shareholder nominations in election con-
tests and relegating shareholders to their own solicitations with re-
spect thereto,2" and in excluding proposals that are not a proper sub-
ject for action by security holders under the laws of the issuer's
domicile,27 the rule provides little real supervision of management's
Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible, in THrE CORPORA-
TION IN MODERN SOcIETY 46, 54 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
2o Hetherington, Pact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 263-66 (1969).
21 See, e.g., J. HuRST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 94-98 (1970); Caplin, Proxies, Annual
Meetings and Corporate Democracy, 37 VA. L. REV. 653 (1951).
22 See, e.g., Note, Financing Proxy Contests with Corporate Funds, 44 GEO. L.J.
303 (1956).
2336 SEC ANN. REP. 46-48 (1970). Twenty of the proxy contests were for con-
trol of the board of directors. Of these, management won nine, two were settled by
negotiation, three were won by non-management insurgents and six were pending as
of June 30, 1970. The remaining four contests were merely for seats on the board of
directors. Of these, management retained all the seats in one contest and non-manage-
ment insurgents won a seat in the other three contests.
24 SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1972).
25 See, e.g., Gilbert, An Independent Shareholder Appraisal, 34 U. DET. LJ. 558
(1957).
28 SEC Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1972).
27SEC Rule 14a-8(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1) (1972). See Brooks v.
Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). There is some indication, how-
ever, that the shareholder's lot may be improving. See Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403
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stewardship. Similarly, shareholder access to the courts in attempts
to supervise management action is severely limited by such proce-
dural devices as security-for-expense statutes2" and the requirement
for demand upon the corporation as a prerequisite to filing a deriva-
tive action.
But if the shareholder has abdicated his position of power, no
one else has successfully assumed his control over management.
While many groups have attempted to assume the supervisory role,
none has yet succeeded. Rather, in the wake of the struggle, man-
agement has emerged as essentially autonomous. Both governmen-
tal and private interests have attempted to impose accountability
upon management in a wide range of corporate activitiesY0 Repre-
sentatives of these interests have come to recognize the modern cor-
poration as a significant center of control over social change, and
consequently the corporation has become increasingly politicalized..'
But, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, the corporation
has become less "responsible" to any outside group, if responsibility
assumes accountability. The owners of capital have lost control of
management and no other group has legitimized its claim to suc-
cession.
B. Sources of Corporate Responsibility
Since Professor Dodd's landmark article32 some forty years ago,
commentators have referred to corporate responsibility as if it were
a readily identifiable concept with dear guidelines and concrete
goals.33 Yet a iealistic view indicates that corporate managers, no less
(1972); and amendments to rule 14a-8, effective Jan. 1, 1973, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 5 24,012 (1972).
2 8 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(b) (West Supp. 1972); N.Y. BUSINESS CORP.
LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Some of these statutes in fact create new liabilities for attorney's fees on the part of
shareholder-plaintiffs. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 372 (2d ed. 1970).
2 See, e.g., W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 887-911 (4th
ed. 1969).
So For detailed accounts of a number of specific instances of private and govern-
mental pressure upon corporations, see S. SETHI, Up AGAINST THE CORPORATE WALL
(1971).
3 1 See Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 Bus. LAw. 1551
(1971).
3 2 Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L REv. 1145
(1932).
33 See, e.g., Schwartz, Corporate Responsibility in the Age of Aquarius, 26 Bus.
LAw. 513 (1970).
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than the general run of mankind, have very different ideas regard-
ing proper social goals. A classic example of this is the decision of
Dow Chemical Company to manufacture napalm. Challenged by
shareholders who wished "to have their assets used in a manner
which they believe[d] to be more socially responsible but possibly
less profitable" than existing company policy,34 the company re-
sponded that:
[Tlhe decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm
was made not because of business considerations, but in spite of
them; that management in essence decided to pursue a course of
activity which generated little profit for the shareholders and ac-
tively impaired the company's public relations and recruitment ac-
tivities because management considered this action morally and
politically desirable.35
This exchange forcefully points out that a major problem of cor-
porate responsibility is identifying the proper goals for the exercise
of corporate power.
The issues upon which corporations have, both figuratively and
literally, manned the barricades in recent years are legion. They
have included minority hiring, 6 ending production of military
weapons, 37 rebuilding the inner city,38 environmental concerns, 9 and
product safety4" among others. Which of these are proper goals for
corporations to pursue? Who is to make that decision?
The breakdown of shareholder control over management activi-
ties has given the choice by default to corporate management.41
Yet, if the goal is to insure that corporate power is subjected to the
overall policies that society in general has determined, it makes little
sense merely to take the decision-making power from management
and return it to shareholders. Were these the only alternatives,
34 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
85Id. at 681.
36 See, e.g., S. SErH, supra note 30, at 50-186.
3 7 See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Proxies for Protesters, TIMd, Jan. 26,
1970, at 69.
3 8 See, e.g., Group Challenges S. & L. Board, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1970, § B, at 1,
col. 4.
39 See, e.g., S. SETHI, supra note 30, at 3-24.
4 0 See, e.g., R. NADER, supra note 4.
4 1 See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR., supra note 16, at 25-60; S. SELEKMAN & B. SELEEMAN,
POWER AN MORALITY IN A BusINEss SociETY 51-67 (1956).
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we might more confidently predict that management would better
heed societal goals than would shareholders.'
Reliance upon private pressure groups is also an insufficient
means of vindicating public concerns. One need only examine some
of the issues raised in recent years to become convinced that re-
sponsiveness to either shareholder groups or pickets is hardly a suf-
ficient solution to the problem posed. For example, in 1967 a
group of pickets urged the ousting of the management of R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. because the corporation was purchasing to-
bacco from Communist-dominated Yugoslavia.4 3 In the same year,
protesters objected to the Chase Manhattan Bank's lending policy
in South Africa, alleging that it endorsed apartheid." In later years,
the targets of protests were often corporations manufacturing items
used in the Viet Nam war.45 These examples illustrate the fact
that narrowly based pressure groups and shareholders are each sub-
ject to tunnel vision, and thus neither group can be relied upon to
insure that society's goals are properly considered in corporate de-
cisions.
Leaving this balancing to corporate management also poses prob-
lems, as Milton Friedman dearly pointed out in his frequently
quoted attack on the doctrine of corporate social responsibility:
If businessmen do have a social responsibility other than making
maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what it
is? Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social
interest is? Can they decide how great a burden they are justified
in placing on themselves or their stockholders to serve that social
interest? Is it tolerable that these public functions of taxation, ex-
penditure and control be exercised by the people who happen at
the moment to be in charge of particular enterprises, chosen for
those posts by strictly private groups? If businessmen are civil
servants rather than the employees of their stockholders then in a
democracy they will, sooner or later, be chosen by the public tech-
niques of election and appointment.46
Although the legitimacy of corporate management as a decision-
maker can be supported in terms of its responsibility as a trustee
42 See, e.g., A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 90-91 (1959); Donaldson,
Financial Goals: Management v. Stockholders, 41 HARv. Bus. REv. May-June, 1963,
at 116, 117-20.
43 Dworsky, New Annual Meeting Note: Social Protest, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1967,
§ 3, at 1, col. 1; Rossant, All You Need Is One Share, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1967, § 4, at
6E, col. 1.
44 Dworsky, supra note 43.
45 See An Activist Agenda for Annual Meetings, BuSINESS WEEK, March 28, 1970,
at 45-46.
4 6 M. FRIEDMAN , CAPrALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962).
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of shareholder capital, 47 a basic philosophical problem remains. A
choice must be made between leaving considerable power in private
hands48 or subjecting centers of nongovernmental power to govern-
mental control.49  The virtue of the former course is to allow di-
verse approaches and conflicting values to exist.50 This notion of
pluralism is deeply imbedded in Western thought.5 It is bottomed,
however, upon the notions that a multiplicity of goals and a diver-
gence of values are acceptable52 and that numerous centers of power
in fact promote diverse objectives.53 Yet it has become increasingly
clear that few societies have been able to tolerate divergent eco-
nomic goals when centers of economic power obtained significant
size.54 In the United States, the modern corporation has not only
grown into a center of immense power, but has increasingly joined
with other large centers of power, both governmental and private,
to adopt common policies and goals.5 5  Under such conditions, the
arguments of those critical of the pluralistic model of society are
telling:
[T~he pluralists naively imagined that private associations inevi-
tably provided the individual with a far better opportunity for
grass-roots democracy, for self-government and self-fulfillment,
than he could find in the state. They completely ignored the like-
lihood that in many cases these associations could be even more
oppressive than the state, because they were not subject to the re-
straints of formal procedure, judicial review, and public scrutiny,
and because they could claim (often more plausibly than the state)
that threats to the very existence of the association justified repres-
sion of dissent and concentration of power.56
47 See Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1365 (1932).
4 8 See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION
IN MOi N SOCIETY 72, 75 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
49 See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 31 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
50 See Brewster, supra note 48, at 75-76.
51 See Chapman, Voluntary Association and the Political Theory of Pluralism, in
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: NOMOS XI 87 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969).
521 d. at 92-93.
5 Cf. Brewster, supra note 48, at 75.
54 A. Berle, Jr. & G. Means in their article on Corporation in IV Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences 414 (1931) trace this phenomenon in the Roman Empire and in
Stuart England. The desire of the government to keep control over increasingly pow-
erful associations was reflected in Roman licensing requirements and English doctrines
that corporations must be created by state fiat.
5 5 See, e.g., M. MINTz & J. COHEN, AMEICA, INc (1971); C. PERROW, THE
RADICAL ATTACK ON BUSINESS 13-16 (1972).
56 Lakoff, Private Government in the Managed Society, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIA-
TIONS: NOMOS XI 170, 176-77 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969).
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As the conditions that promote pluralism have disappeared, in-
creasing concern has been expressed as to the necessity of subjecting
centers of economic power to the overall goals which the society
has enunciated through its political processes.5 7  The debate over
the proper scope of governmental control now moves to a different
inquiry. In short, the question is whether the risk that the political
process will not operate to impose the proper values on all of society
outweighs the risk that unchecked corporate power will, in its ad-
mittedly more limited sphere, choose the wrong priorities.
The question has, however, largely been answered. Virtually
without exception, the reaction to exercises of corporate power that
conflict with broader societal goals has been resort to governmental
regulation.58 At least in theory, this development has been the most
appropriate of possible alternative courses, since the politically
elected organs of government are the only institutions structured to
make the difficult policy choices at issue.
The fact that this resort to governmental policy-making has pro-
ceeded piecemeal makes it no less real.59 The proliferation of regu-
latory programs, particularly at the federal level, has left few, if
any, large corporations free from substantial governmental control
in significant aspects of their business. While the growth of gov-
ernmental regulation is universally acknowledged, its effect upon
corporate responsibility has been less clearly perceived. In classical
economic terms, extensive governmental regulation need not destroy
management's obligation to shareholders. The cost of ignoring such
regulations is merely a factor to be taken into account in pursuing
profit maximization."° Violations will lead to fines, loss of goodwill,
or other damage that will lessen profits. If the cost of compliance
is greater than the cost of violation, classical economic considera-
tions encourage violation.6 Under this theory, there is no corporate
responsibility beyond profit maximization.62
Such an approach, however, ignores the fact that while manage-
5 T See Chayes, supra note 49, at 31; MacNaughton, A Responsible Business, 44
N.Y.S.B.J. 160 (1972).
58 See A. BERLE, JR., POWER WrouT PROPERTY 113-14 (1959); Holton, Busi-
ness and Government, 98 DAEDALus 41 (1969).
59 See J. HuRsT, supra note 21, at 108-09.
60See Gordon, Pollutants or Profits, 26 Bus. LAW. 541 (1970).
61 See Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
143, 171-74 (1961). Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30
(1958).
62See Friedman, A Social Conscience for Business, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 13,
1970, § 1A, at 1-2.
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ment's obligations to maximize shareholder profits may have grown
out of free-market economics, those obligations are imposed by state
law, not by economic principles. Duties to shareholder interests
cannot justify violation of regulatory statutes, regardless of the eco-
nomic rationality of such action.6  The content of corporate respon-
sibility is not only what free-market economic theory demands, but
also what state and federal law requires.
Under state corporate law, directors have fiduciary obligations
to the corporation. If directors waste corporate assets, it is the
corporation which has a cause of action.64 It is mismanagement of
the corporate entity that is the gravamen of any complaint. The
assumption underlying traditional profit-maximization theories is
that the corporation, as an entity, is concerned with profit-maximi-
zation. This pursuit of profits, however, is limited by other obliga-
tions imposed upon the corporation. As Milton Friedman phrases
it, the goal of profit-maximization is the sole responsibility of the
corporation "so long as it stays within the rules of the game."6 5 The
corporation is equally mismanaged when it ignores its obligations
to act within the rules as when it ignores its obligation to maximize
profits within the limitations of those rules.66 Viewed in this man-
ner, corporate social responsibility is merely responsibility to act
within the rules.
Thus, the sources of corporate responsibility are two-fold. Not
only does the corporation have an obligation to its shareholders, it
also has an obligation to the community at large. The delineation
of the scope of corporate social responsibility has increasingly been
undertaken by the federal government. As a result, a federal com-
mon law of corporate responsibility is emerging which takes priority
over the traditional fiduciary obligation of profit maximization.
Even though the development of this law of corporate responsibility
has come to rest with the federal government, as the discussion be-
low will indicate, the application of this federal law to particular
situations still requires corporate management to resolve some ex-
tremely complex policy issues.
63 Cf. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961): "Moreover, while
Gintel undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary relationship to his customers, this relationship
could not justify any actions by him contrary to law."
64 See generally H. HENN, supra note 28, at 457-59, 755-61 (2d ed. 1970).
65 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 133.
66 Cf. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423 (1908); Aiple v. Twin
City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 143 N.W.2d 374 (1966).
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III. A VIEW oF THE EMERGING FEDERAL LAW
OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Development of the Federal Law
Political control of corporate responsibility was once a task un-
dertaken by states. The period of incorporation by special act of
a state legislature was a period of maximum political control. In
1799, for example, the New York legislature granted a charter to
The Manhattan Company providing that the corporation should be
dissolved unless within ten years it furnished a supply of water suffi-
dent for the use of all citizens of New York City.67 Both under
specially granted charters and early general incorporation acts, states
placed a ceiling upon the amount of capital that could be author-
ized in order to prevent problems resulting from concentrations of
wealth and power."
Had the states maintained this policy of control over corporate
power, the present day problems of corporate responsibility might
never have arisen. But the history to the contrary is well known.
New Jersey, and then Delaware, led the way toward statutes that
freed management from significant controls.69 The twentieth cen-
tury witnessed a race to eliminate restrictions on management's dis-
cretion. The revenue generated by incorporation fees and franchise
taxes7o plus the control over state legislatures exerted by pro-man-
67 See People v. President and Directors of the Manhattan Co., 9 N.Y. 351, 357
(Sup. Ct. 1832); E. DODD, AMERICAN BusINEss CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 at
182-83 (1954).
68A comprehensive review of state limitations upon the amount of authorized cap-
ital and scope of business activities is found in the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Liggett Co. v. Leo, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 550-64 (1933). See also Berle, Historical In-
heritance of American Corporations, from 3 THE POwERS AN DUTIES OF CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT (1950), as reprinted in W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR-
PORATIONS 1-3 (4th ed, unabridged, 1969); E. DODD, supra, note 67, at 232, 315.
609 H. HENN, supra note 28, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1970). For a discussion of the phi-
losophy underlying modem general incorporation statutes, see Katz, The Philosophy of
Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 177 (1958); Latty,
Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599
(1965).
70 See, e.g., Note, Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 33
AM. L REV. 418 (1899):
Meanwhile the little community of truck-farmers and clam-diggers have had
their cupidity excited by the spectacle of their northern neighbor, New Jersey,
becoming rich and bloated through the granting of franchises to trusts which
are to do business everywhere except in New Jersey, and which are to go
forth panoplied by the sovereign State of New Jersey to afflict and curse
other American communities.
Id. at 418-19.
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agement lobbyists7' quickly led the states out of the business of con-
trolling corporate responsibility.
State abdication of regulation led inevitably to federal action.
What began as piecemeal legislation over various aspects of inter-
state commerce quickly became a widespread network of federal
rules governing corporate responsibility.72 A federal standard of
corporate behavior was imposed upon institutions that were the
creations of state law. The federal interest in corporate activity has
become sufficiently pervasive to create a federal common law of
corporate responsibility. This fact was clearly recognized by the
New Jersey Corporation Law Revision Commission in its 1968 re-
port:
The modern corporation's business is frequently national or
international in scope; its state of incorporation is largely inci-
dental. Recognizing this fact, and seeking to attract corporations
to establish their domiciles within their borders, most states in re-
cent decades have been increasingly flexible and permissive in re-
vising their corporation laws.
Pursuing this policy perhaps further than any other state, the
Commission believes it is following sound public policy for New
Jersey. It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors,
employees, customers and the general public have come, and must
continue to come, from federal legislation and not from state cor-
poration acts. Whether it be anti-trust or securities regulation;
wage and hour or social security laws; bankruptcy or corporate re-
organization statutes; or even controls over personnel practices pro-
vided in the Internal Revenue Code, or controls over the methods
of marketing and advertising products, provided both by statutes
and by administrative agencies, the means of assuring such protec-
tions must be provided by the federal government. Any attempt
to provide such regulations in the public interest through state in-
corporation acts and similar legislation would only drive corpora-
tions out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.73
It appears that other drafters of state corporation statutes have
also recognized that it is the federal government's function to pre-
scribe standards of corporate social behavior. The early versions of
the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) recognized a limited
role for the federal government by providing that corporations had
the power "in time of war to transact any lawful business in aid of
the United States in the prosecution of the war."'74 The 1969 revi-
71 See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
72 See Holton, Business and Government, 98 DAEDALUS 41 (1969).
-73 Corporation Law Revision Commission, Preface to N.J. STAT. ANN § 14A, at
xi (1969).
74 MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 4(n) (1960).
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sion of the MBCA recognized the expanded role of the federal gov-
ernment by empowering corporations "to transact any lawful busi-
ness which the board of directors shall find will be in aid of govern-
mental policy. ' 75
The development of a new federal common law - a post-Erie7'
common law in areas of federal concern - has been widely noted.77
As Justice Harlan stated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:
"[T]here are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the
States .... Principles formulated by federal judicial law have been
thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests."7
Where Congress has expressed by statute a clear federal interest
in specific areas, federal courts have been ready to fashion rules
governing private disputes. Thus, in its famous Lincoln Mills de-
cision, the Supreme Court found that section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act authorized the federal courts to create a
body of federal common law "which the courts must fashion from
the policy of our national labor laws"7 9 to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements.
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 0 the Supreme Court
held that the liability of the United States on a check drawn by it is
a question of federal common law, in the absence of specific con-
gressional legislation. In Sabbatino,8' the Court found that applica-
tion of the "act of state" doctrine in the context of contract litiga-
7 5 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 4(n) (1971). The provision has been adopted by
Delaware, 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 122(12) (Supp. 1970). The provision, in effect,
reinforces the current trend, noted earlier, of allowing broader management-board of
directors discretion to meet social responsibilities without any concomitant accountability
for inaction.
76 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 7 See D. Ctmum, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MAT'ruLs 672-92 (1968);
Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
383, 405 (1964). In this regard the oft-quoted passage from Mr. Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S.
447, 472 (1942) is appropriate:
(Federal law) is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law.
Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is
conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply
the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the
sources of the common law in cases such as the present.
78376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
7 9 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See also
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
80318 U.S. 363 (1943).
81 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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tion was a question of federal law because of the "intrinsically fed-
eral"' nature of the problems involved.
The general question of corporate social responsibility has also
become "intrinsically federal." ' The individual states have become
unwilling and unable to enforce limitations upon corporations re-
quired by the broader societal concerns of our times. 4  They have
engaged in competitions to eliminate restrictions upon corporate
management in order to attract corporations from elsewhere. 5
State attempts to give shareholders supervisory control over the
activities of management have given way to direct federal control
over corporate behavior."6 In place of shareholder control of profit
maximization, the federal government has emphasized liquidity of
the securities markets.8 7  The modern thrust of federal securities
legislation has been disclosure of information relevant to purchases
and sales of securities.88 Instead of providing federal remedies to
insure profit maximization,89 Congress has chosen to insure that
82Id. at 427. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Note,
Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1972).
83 Cf. Note, Stockholders' Derivative Suits: A Federal Question?, 27 IND. L.J. 231
(1952).
84 See Latty, supra note 69; Law for Sale, supra note 71. Occasionally states have
imposed public interest limitations upon corporate activity which go beyond and do not
conflict with federal policies. Insofar as the state-imposed policies are consistent with
the broader federal requirements, they are, of course, also a source of normative require-
ments for corporate action. Cf. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMS 435-36 (1953).
85 H. HENN, supra note 28, § 12; Latty, supra note 69, at 611-19.
86See J. HURST, supra note 21, at 82-111; Latty, supra note 69, at 616-17.
87 See 11 REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 13-18 (1963).
88 See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs (The Wheat Report) 10 (1969):
Disclosure is and has from the outset been a central aspect of national policy
in the field of securities regulation. The emphasis on disclosure rests on two
considerations. One relates to the proper function of Federal government
in investment matters. Apart from the prevention of fraud and manipulation,
the draftsmen of the '33 and '34 Acts viewed that responsibility as being pri-
marily one of seeing to it that investors and speculators had access to enough
information to enable them to arrive at their own rational decisions. The
other, less direct, rests on the belief that appropriate publicity tends to deter
questionable practices and to elevate standards of business conduct.
89 See Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cit. 1968), in which plaintiff alleged
that defendants, who were directors, officers and majority shareholders, had siphoned
off the earnings of the corporation in order to depress the price of plaintiff's shares.
Plaintiff had not sold his shares. The court affirmed the district court's granting of
defendants' motion for summary judgment, saying: ". .. the plaintiff is not a seller and
cannot invoke the civil remedy afforded by [rule lOb-5]. His recourse is to the minor-
ity stockholders' derivative action which he brought and which is now pending in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York," Id. at 581-82. Thus, while state actions
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shareholders can sell their shares at a price determined by informed
judgmentY0
Despite continuing efforts to undermine its holding,9' Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp.02 is still accepted by most courts as
accurately stating the rule regarding standing under SEC rule lob-
5.93 In Birnbaum, the Second Circuit pointed out that section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, under which rule lob-5
was promulgated, "was directed solely at that type of misrepresen-
tation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of cor-
porate affairs, and that [rule lob-5] extended protection to the
defrauded purchaser or seller .... -"1 Thus, as long as Birnbaum re-
tains its vitality no federal cause of action under the securities laws
will lie to vindicate shareholders' interests that profits be increased
at the expense of socially useful expenditures unless the shareholder
can prove that he was a defrauded purchaser or seller. Even if
Birnbaum is eventually overruled, the plaintiff, whether or not he
is a purchaser or seller, will still have to prove "an injury as a result
of deceptive practices touching" a purchase or sale of securities."
Furthermore, although rule lob-5 does provide a remedy for
misappropriation if the purchaser-seller requirement is satisfied,97 it
was not directed primarily toward "transactions which comprise no
more than internal corporate mismanagement."98 Thus, in order
to recover the plaintiff must show some fraudulent or deceptive
practices on behalf of the defendant in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security. Rule lOb-5 does not require profit maximiza-
tion or socially useful expenditures. All the SEC requires is an
may remain for shareholder use in attempting to insure maximum profits, the focus of
federal legislation has not been on profit maximization, but rather on the regulation
of the marketplace in which the stockholder may disinvest. See notes 91-99 infra &
accompanying text.
90 See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STocK MARKET (1966).
9 1 See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972);
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA.
L. REV. 268 (1968). In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.10 (1971), the Supreme Court went out of its way to "express no opinion" on
the continuing vitality of the Birnbaum doctrine.
92 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
93 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
o9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
95 193 F.2d at 464.
96 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
See Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972).
9 7 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. at 11 n.7.
1s 1d.at 12. See text accompanying note 118 infra.
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absence of such deceptive practices in securities transactions as non-
disclosure of the costs that will be incurred in complying, for ex-
ample, with anti-pollution requirements, or for not complying with
the civil rights provisions in the law. 9"
In sum, absence of state control over corporate behavior has re-
sulted in a pervasive, if piecemeal, pattern of federal legislation that
forms the basis of a federal common law of corporate responsibility
overlying traditional requirements of profit maximization.
B. Examples of the Federal Law of Corporate Responsibility
It is no longer possible to judge corporate actions solely within
the narrow framework of state laws. Federal regulations, designed
to reflect broad policy goals, have augmented state law and have es-
tablished a network of standards with which corporations must com-
ply. This federal law of corporate responsibility includes, inter
alia, the express standards established by Congress, the policies sup-
porting these standards, and judicial interpretation thereof. The
interaction of these elements imposes upon the corporation the duty
to act within their spirit as well as their letter. The scope of fed-
eral law relating to corporate social responsibility is so broad that
the impact of federalization can be best examined in the context of
several examples.
Case 1. Corporation X wishes to move its manufacturing plant
from the center of a large metropolitan area to the suburbs. It has
determined that such a move will create substantial savings. The
real and personal property tax assessed on the corporation will be
slightly lower in the suburban location. Because the suburban lo-
cation is nearer its warehouses, transportation costs will be reduced.
Because of lower crime rates in the new location, fewer plant guards
will be needed. A newly constructed plant will embody new tech-
nological advances. Moreover, the corporation can sell its old
plant to a company that desires to use the location for a parking
lot. It will be able to realize an amount sufficient to purchase and
construct its suburban plant.
What factors must the directors consider and may they authorize
this move? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 gives rise
to an obligation to consider the effect of such a move on equal em-
99 SEC Securities Act Release 5170, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 78,150 (July 19, 1971); SEC Securities Act Release 5253, (1971-1972
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC L. REP. g 78,524 (Feb. 16, 1972).
10042 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
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ployment opportunity. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' the Su-
preme Court construed broadly the obligation placed upon employ-
ers:
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification . .. The Act proscribes not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form but discrimina-
tory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.' 0 2
Relying upon such statements, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission has suggested that corporations have an
obligation under federal law not to transfer facilities in ways that
will create employment barriers for minorities in the absence of
some overwhelming business necessity.3' The question of suffi-
cient business necessity is apparently for the federal courts to de-
termine. Applying this principle in another context, a federal dis-
trict court has held invalid a company rule requiring the discharge
of an employee after multiple wage garnishments. Because blacks
tended to have their wages attached more often than whites, this was
found to violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 4  The increased cost
of the clerical work involved was found to be insufficient justifica-
tion for dismissal since it was not related to job performance. Add-
ed expense to the employer was not a permissible rationale for
policies that, although neutral on their face, had the effect of dis-
criminating. 15
Therefore management must consider the possible discriminatory
effects resulting from a transfer of plant operations. In addition, if
management's decision is challenged, it must show sufficient busi-
ness necessity - mere economic advantage may not suffice - to
justify its move in light of anti-discriminatory policies that are a
part of federal corporate responsibility law.
Case 2. Corporation Y has been notified that one of its plants
101401 U.S. 424 (1971).
102 Id. at 431.
103 See Chapman, EEOC Would Curb Moves to Suburbs, Wash. Post, Aug. 27,
1971, at 1, col. 4.
0 4 Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 322 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See
also EEOC Decision No. 72-1497, CCH EMPLOYmENT PRAc. GUmE S 6352 (March
30, 1972).
105 Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
The question of at what point, if any, added expense would be sufficient to constitute
a "business necessity defense" is an issue with which courts are accustomed to dealing,
much like the "business judgment" rule. E.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
19731
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 294
is operating in violation of air pollution standards prescribed pur-
suant to the Clean Air Act." 8 The corporation proposes to close
this plant in City C rather than comply with the regulations. The
corporation is the major employer in City C, and the plant closing
will create substantial unemployment. May the corporation close
its plant ?107
It can be argued that the Clean Air Act must be interpreted in
light of other federal legislation, such as the Employment Act of
1946.. s These statutes clearly set forth a federal policy encourag-
ing full employment."" Congress, it seems, did not contemplate
that pollution control should be accomplished at the expense of em-
ployment opportunity. Indeed Congress specifically provided that
one of the purposes of the Clean Air Act was "to protect and en-
hance the quality of the nation's air resources so as to promote...
the productive capacity of its population."" 0
An analogy may be drawn to the case of Textile Workers Union
v. Darlington Manufacturing Co."' There, the Supreme Court held
that the dosing of a plant may violate the National Labor Relations
Act when the purpose and effect of the dosing is to chill unionism
in other parts of the enterprise. In the case of corporation Y, dos-
ing the polluting facility, at least in the absence of major cost differ-
entials, will both discourage those most affected - the local com-
munity - from exerting pressure for pollution abatement and
violate the congressional intention of abating pollution without
interferring with other important national objectives.
Case 3. Corporation Z manufactures electronic equipment for
the United States Army. Orders for the company's civilian products
have increased recently. Since its profit margins on civilian goods
are higher than those produced under government contracts, the cor-
potation plans to end its production of military goods upon expira-
tion of its present contracts. May it do so?
The federal interest in adequately providing for the national de-
fense can hardly be disputed. The Defense Production Act of
1042 U.S.C. § 1857(a)-(/) (1970).
10 7 See Abel, Smoke vs. Jobs - End of Myth, 5 ENvIRONmENTAL SCIMNCE &
TEcHNOLOGY 659 (1971).
10815 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970).
109 See IBM Moves to Cut Back Work Force, Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1971, § C, at 9,
col. 1. Cf. Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [19622 1 Ch. 927.
110 Clean Air Act § 101(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b) (1) (1970).
M 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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195011 has given the President broad authority to require private
industry to perform government contracts or orders."' Despite such
dear federal interest, the courts have hesitated to develop a federal
common law going beyond this specific congressional mandate." 4
These decisions, however, do not necessarily preclude an inter-
pretation of the Defense Production Act that establishes a federal
policy encouraging the acceptance of military orders. In light of the
policy behind this Act and the fact that defense requirements can-
not be met without the aid of private industry, federal corporate law
may establish a responsibility to accept such orders in the absence
of compelling reasons to the contrary." 5 Thus corporation Z may
be required to evidence business reasons beyond higher profit mar-
gins in order to justify its refusal to accept government orders.
These examples serve to demonstrate the nature and breadth of
the federal law of corporate responsibility. While it is dear that
corporate activity should be subject to its restrictions, a standard
must be developed to judge the validity of corporate activity, par-
ticularly when management is confronted with conflicting policy de-
mands.
C. Conflicting Policies and Business Judgment
The piecemeal development of the federal law of corporate re-
sponsibility has led to conflicting policy demands. A striking ex-
ample is presented in Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. SEC."6
There, the corporation's attempt to finance low rent housing projects
in the inner city conflicted with the policy of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 193517 limiting diversification of utility hold-
ing companies. A myraid of other examples might be imagined.
Purchasing an advanced piece of machinery from a foreign manu-
facturer might harm the American balance of payments, but using
less advanced American-made devices might increase air or water
112 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (1970).
113 Id. § 2071. Furthermore, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
provisions in their corporate statutes specifically authorizing corporations in time of
war to transact business in aid of the United States war efforts. I ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., 182-85 (2d ed. 1971). In addition, Delaware has the broader
provision discussed supra at note 75.
14 See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173. 177 (2d Cir. 1955); Acorn Iron &
Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 96 F. Supp. 481 (R.D. Pa. 1951).
115 Cf. Daynard, The Use of Social Policy in Judicial Decision-Making, 56 CORNELL
L REV. 919 (1971).
116 444 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11T 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970).
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pollution. Attempts to institute special job training programs for
hard-core unemployed persons might increase the price of goods sup-
plied to the federal government when such persons are employed
on work under government contracts.
When conflicting policies are present, directors cannot be ex-
pected to exercise Solomonic judgment, but they can be expected to
consider their decisions in the light of the conflicting policies. The
fact that policies sometimes conflict is not reason to ignore the im-
plications of all policies.
To ensure that the legal duties of corporate directors are not un-
reasonably harsh and that such duties are consistent with commercial
needs, the courts long ago developed a "business judgment" rule
that operates to vindicate directors if they make a good faith judg-
ment between conflicting obligations. Just as a mere error in good
faith business judgment has traditionally been a defense to share-
holder charges of corporate mismanagement,1 so should the busi-
ness judgment rule provide a defense to charges of irresponsibility
leveled by other interests.
The courts have imposed liability for negligence, not for poor
business judgment. Thus failure to employ proper criteria for de-
cisions may result in liability." 9 Directors should not be excused
from failing entirely to consider the relevant policies. Perhaps what
is needed is a requirement that directors consider a "social respon-
sibility impact statement" in connection with each decision, much
like the National Environmental Policy Act requirement that federal
officials consider the environmental impact of proposed action. 2
118 See generally H. HENN, supra note 28, at 482-83; N. LATrIN, TtIE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 272-74 (2d ed. 1971).
119 See, e.g., Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880). See also Cary & Harris, Standards
of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus.
LAw. SPECLAL IssuH 61, 71-73 (1972); Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officers for
Violations of Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313 (1965).
120 Section 102 (C) of the National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C)
(1970), provides that all agencies of the federal government shall:
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
These are some, but by no means all, of the factors which a board of directors should
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Recent studies have shown that all too often directors exercise
little or no independent judgment upon recommendations made by
the chief executive officer of the corporation. 12' A federal common
law of corporate responsibility ought at least to require that direc-
tors use their positions to assess the social consequences of proposed
action. Indeed their ability to evaluate more technical aspects of the
action is at best limited."z This proposed function of social evalua-
tion may be the only meaningful one that directors can perform.
The standard to be applied to determine whether directors have
adequately carried out their social impact evaluation might very well
be patterned after the standard imposed by section 11 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) upon those who are responsible
for the accuracy of registration statements.'ns Paraphrasing that
test, the directors must, after reasonable investigation, have reason-
able ground to believe and in fact believe that the action to be taken
by the corporation is consistent with federal standards of corporate
responsibility. Where there appear to be conflicting policy demands,
the director should be required to exercise the same degree of care
and skill in reconciling them or choosing between them as a prudent
man would exercise under the circumstances in the conduct of his
own affairs. This requirement resembles the duty placed upon trus-
tees in cases of default under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.12
Only by imposin the requirement of reasonable investigation by
the directors is it likely that meaningful decisions will be made.
Whether each director must conduct an independent investigation
poses the same difficult problem as faced by an underwriting syndi-
cate in connection with its obligations under section 11 of the Se-
curities Act.125 Whether or not it is reasonable to allow the man-
aging underwriter in that context to carry out the investigative
activities for the entire syndicate, it may be overly burdensome to
consider in conjunction with any corporate decision. Cf. E. GOLDSTON, THE QUANTI-
FICATION OF CONCERN: SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTING (1971).
121M. MACE, DIEECrORS: MYTH AND REALITY 10-85 (1971); cf. Vanderwicken,
Change Invades the Boardroom, FORTUNE, May 1972, at 156.
122See J. GALDRAImH, THE NEw INDUSTuAX. STATE 72-85 (1967).
2 3 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (A) (1970).
The application of this standard to all decisions of directors is suggested by George D.
Gibson in Conard, Mace, Blough & Gibson, Functions of Directors Under the Existing
System, 27 Bus. LAw. SPECIAL ISSUE 23, 43-45 (1972).
12 4 Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1970). See
also, remarks of George D. Gibson in Conard, Mace, Blough & Gibson, supra note 123,
at 45.
12See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 n.26 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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require outside directors to conduct the factual investigations un-
derlying social impact decisions. For that reason, at least the out-
side directors ought to be able to rely upon the facts presented in
a social impact statement prepared for the board. Again, by analogy
to section 11 of the Securities Act,'26 if such directors can show that
they had no reasonable ground to believe and did not in fact believe
that any part of the social impact statement was untrue or that it
omitted material facts, they should not be held liable for judgments
based upon the statement.2 7  This, of course, should not relieve
them of the obligation to make a good faith decision based upon
careful consideration of the social impact statement.
IV. ENFORCING THE FEDERAL LAW OF CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY - A PROPOSAL
A. A Review of Presently Proposed Methods of Enforcement
Proposals for enforcing notions of corporate responsibility have
not been lacking. Most of the proposals to date have called for
one of three basic approaches: (a) shareholder enforcement of so-
cial responsibility; (b) governmental appointment of public interest
directors; or (c) direct legislative or administrative imposition of
responsibilities on corporations.
The attempt at shareholder enforcement has found expression
in Campaign GM, 8 and similar attempts to obtain shareholder
votes for specific policies; in attempts to encourage investment in
only socially responsible corporations; 9 and in proposals to modify
shareholder voting power.' These methods have been largely un-
120 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b) (3) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (C) (1970).
'
2 7 This standard would be analogous to state corporate law provisions protecting
directors who rely in good faith upon financial statements represented as correct by
corporate officers or by independent certified public accountants. E.g., N.Y. BusiNFss
CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963), and the somewhat more broadly worded pro-
visons of 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(3) (Supp. 1970). See also Conard, Mace, Blough
& Gibson, supra note 123, at 42.
128 See, e.g., Hay, The Shareholder's Role in Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 U.
MICL J.L. REFORM 68 (1971); Wells, The Greening of James Roche, NEw YORK
MAGAZINE, Dec. 21, 1970, at 35.
129 See, e.g., Social Dividends - A New Corporate Responsibility, TRENDS IN
MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT INVESTOR RELATIONS (No. 210, Oct 1970). See also
the shareholder proposal for proxy solicitation material of Fidelity Trend Fund, Inc.,
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 97 at A10-11, E1-5 (April 14, 1971).
130 See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Mod-
ern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L REV. 1, 16-21 (1969); Ratner, The Gov-
ernment of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One
Vote," 56 CORNELL L REV. 1 (1970).
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successful, first, because significant numbers of shareholders have
been unwilling to forego profit maximization. 131  More basically,
however, merely shifting the decision on social issues from manage-
ment to shareholders in no way insures that a determination in the
public interest will be made.3 2
Governmental appointment of public interest directors has been
a more common method of attempting to promote corporate deci-
sions in the public interest.'3 Apparently, its first use by the federal
government was in the Second Bank of the United States. Twenty
of the bank's directors were elected by private shareholders, while
five were appointed by the President of the United States with the
advice and consent of the Senate.'34 Later in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Union Pacific Railroad was organized with, at first, two out
of fifteen,'35 and later five out of twenty36 federally appointed
directors.13 7  In 1913, the device of government-appointed di-
rectors was used in making up part of the board of federal reserve
banks.'38 Government-appointed directors were used again in 1962
when Congress, in setting up the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion, provided for Presidential appointment (with confirmation by
the Senate) of three of the corporation's fifteen directors.' 39 The
latest use of federally appointed directors appears to be in the 1968
transformation of the Federal National Mortgage Association into
a privately owned corporation.'4
Studies of the use of public interest directors have generally con-
131 Despite the massive effort, Campaign GM did not obtain the votes of more than
2.73 percent of the outstanding shares on any one of their proposals. Blumberg, supra
note 31, at 1561. Blumberg, however, feels that Campaign GM was a "considerable
success" since GM responded by initiating serveral new programs in areas of public
concern, including the creation of a public policy committee of its board of directors -
one of Campaign GM's proposals. Id. at 1561-63. The GM results are not atypical. See,
e.g., Mintz, Warner-Lambert Rejects Warning Notices Abroad, Wash. Post, May 3,
1972, at A3, col. 6. For a provocative examination of the proper role of universities
in voting portfolio shares, see J. SIMoN, C. POWERS, & J. GUNNEmANN, Tm E nu-
CAL INVESrOR: UN VERSmES AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBIITY (1972).
13 2 See note 42 supra & accompanying text
133 States and municipalities employed this practice in the early development of
canals and railroads. Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Cor-
poration - The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARV. L. REV. 350 (1965).
13 4 Act of April 10, 1816, § 8, 3 Stat. 266, 269.
13 5 Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, 491.
'
3 6 Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Star. 356, 361.
137 See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 357-61.
138 Federal Reserve Act, § 4, 38 Stat 251, 256 (1913).
139 47 U.S.C. § 733-(a) (1970).
140 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (1970).
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cluded that the use of such directors is not an effective means of
protecting the public interest in corporate decision making. At the
most basic level, such directors, where used to date, have always con-
stituted a minority of the board and could thus easily be outvoted.'
Second, in an attempt to appoint public interest directors of high
caliber, the government has often chosen men without specific ex-
pertise in the technical areas in which the corporation operates."
In any event, the public interest director finds himself in the posi-
tion of all outside directors - unfamiliar with the details that of-
ficers on the board, who devote full time to the company, have at
hand. 4' Third, the exact duties of the public interest director have
generally been inadequately spelled out so that the director experi-
ences conflict between duties to the public and to shareholders.'44
Fourth, there is a danger that close relationships between public in-
terest directors and other management personnel will lead the pub-
lic interest representative to see problems in the same way as his col-
leagues.' 45 Finally, it has been suggested that government-appointed
directors may create even less corporate responsiveness by lessening
the scope of regulation undertaken by regulatory agencies which
would otherwise deal more firmly with the corporation. 48
Proposals suggesting direct legislative or administrative imposi-
tion of social responsibilities on corporations have taken numerous
forms. The creation of various regulatory agencies is, of course, a
form of this approach. 4 7  Yet many advocates of corporate so-
cial responsibility have found this type of administrative agency to
be inadequate. Its inadequacies have been attributed to a number
of causes, not the least of which are the uneven funding of programs
as political concern with the agency fluctuates, undue influence by
the industry being regulated, and loss of responsiveness through
over-formalization of procedures. 48
141 See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 354, 358-59.
14 2 Id. at 355-56.
143 See Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His Job, 27 HARV. Bus. REV.
585, 588-90 (1949).
144 See Protection of the Public Interest in the Structure and Operations of the Com-
mnoications Satellite Corporation, 18 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 630, 631-41 (1963);
Schwartz, supra note 133, at 353-55, 358, 361-63; Vagts, Reforming the "Modern"
Corporation: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 82 (1966).
145 See Vagts, supra note 144, at 86-87.
146 Schwartz, supra note 133, at 364.
147 See J. HURST, THE LEGniMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 162-63 (1970).
14 8 See W. CARY, POLITIcS AND THE REGULATORY AGiNcIES 60-68 (1967).
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In place of agencies that direct their activities toward specific
industries, it has been suggested that broader regulation of the so-
cial activities of corporations be centralized. Proposals of this type
have suggested continuous governmental supervision of corporate
activities to insure a proper regard for the public interest,1 49 some-
times suggesting federal incorporation of businesses as well.'
In fact, a system does exist at present that operates in this
manner. The federal procurement system has been used regularly
in recent years to insure that government contractors carry out spe-
cific social policies. 5' Federal procurement contracts require that
contractors give preference to American suppliers, " ' that they agree
to employ no convict labor,'" and that they not discriminate against
employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'5 Comprehensive assurances of equal employment oppor-
tunity are also required. 5 Depending upon the circumstances,
federal procurement contracts must include clauses that encourage
subcontracting to small business,5" that require compliance with the
Humane Slaughter Act of 195815T when livestock products are sold
to the government, 58 or that give preference to subcontractors in
areas of labor surplus. 59
The use of the procurement system to carry out social objec-
tives has generally been limited to conditions directly related to pro-
duction of the goods or services that are the subject of the contract.
Expansion of this regulation to other aspects of corporate activities
might impose unmanageable administrative burdens.5 0 Even if the
administrative problems are manageable, past experience has indi-
cated that significant dangers of arbitrary enforcement are present
149 See Fischer, The Lost Liberals, 194 HARPERS 385, 391-95 (1947).
150 See M. Mnrrz & J. CoHEN, AMERIcA, I xc, 441-42 (1972); Wallich, What
Future for Corporations, Sept., 1971, reprint from CrIcoRP. MAGAZINE.
151 See Hannah, Government by Procurement, 18 Bus. LAw. 997 (1963).
152 See Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. 10a-10d (1970); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-6.104-5,
1-7.101-14 (1972).
153 See Act of Feb. 23, 1887, 18 U.S.C. § 436 (1970); 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-7.101-15,
1-12.201 to 1-12.203 (1972).
'
5 4 See 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-18 (1972).
15 5 The Philadelphia Plan is a regulation promulgated pursuant to Exec. Order
11246, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). See Note, The Philadelphia
Plan: Remedial Racial Classification in Employment, 58 GEO. I.J. 1187 (1970).
15641 C.F.R. §§ 1-7.101-21, 1-1.710-3 (1972).
1577 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1970).
15841 CF.R. §§ 1-7.101-24, 1-4.605 (1972).
'5941 C.F.R. §§ 1-7.101-25, 1-7.101-27, 1-1.805-3 (1972).
160 See Wallich, supra note 150, at 6-7.
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when enforcement powers are placed in the hands of contracting
officers.""
B. The Public Interest Derivative Suit
Numerous federal regulatory agencies have been established
with a mandate to consider the "public interest" as a guide in rule-
making. 62 Exclusive reliance upon agency action, however, has
proved to be inadequate. To check the exercise of agency discre-
tion, courts have found statutory authority to permit interested pri-
vate parties to question whether the "public interest" is in fact
being served.'" 3 Particularly in connection with the granting of
licenses and similar permits, the public interest has not been left
solely to agency determination. Affected persons have been per-
mitted to act as "private attorneys general" in order to vindicate the
public's interest in compliance with standards enacted to control
governmental action.6
A similar private check on governmental activities has developed
in other areas through the taxpayer's suit. Initially as to local offi-
cials, 65 and increasingly at the federal level,' 66 courts granted stand-
ing to taxpayers who wished to challenge governmental expendi-
tures. Taxpayers were permitted to question the legality of official
action and to enjoin illegal expenditures; they were not limited
merely to receiving a refund of their tax payments. 6 7  The tax-
payer became a private attorney general attempting to vindicate the
public's interest in proper administration of tax revenues.
A third use of the private attorney general - although often not
recognized as such - is the shareholder derivative suit. In free
market economic theory, profit maximization is not an end in itself.
Rather it is the method by which the most rational allocation of
economic resources is maintained. Profit maximization is seen as
161 See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 387 (1966).
162 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970) (Federal Communication Commission); 49
U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78i(b), 78n(a)
(1970) (Securities and Exchange Commission).
163 See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
164 Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). See L JAFFE, JuDIciAL
CONTROL OF ADMiNISTRATIVE ACTION, 459-500 (abr. student ed. 1965); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 22.05 (1958 and Supp. 1970).
1 65 See L JAFFE, supra note 164, at 459-94; 4 E. YOKLEY, MUNICaPAL CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 602-06 (1959 and 1972 Supp.).
166 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); D. CUtRIE, FEDERAL COURTS
53-70 (1968); K. DAVIS, supra note 164, §§ 22.09 to .09-7 (1970 Supp.).
167 5ee, e.g., 4 F. YOKLEY, supra note 165, § 605.
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a limitation that serves the public interest in determining the proper
use of corporate wealth and power." 8 It is the public concern that
societal limitations be enforced that traditionally permitted the at-
torney general of a state to demand forfeiture of the corporate
charter in a quo warranto proceeding when the corporation had mis-
used corporate powers. " The more common method of enforcing
societal limitations upon the use of corporate assets, however, has
been to permit a shareholder to "conscript the corporation as a com-
plainant' 70 in a derivative action. Such actions permit the corpo-
ration, at the shareholder's behest, to insist upon proper manage-
ment by its directors and officers.
The shareholder's interest in a derivative suit is much the same
as a taxpayer's interest in his public action. 17 Just as the taxpayer
will receive no refund, likewise the shareholder will receive no
direct recovery of profits.'7 Rather, the corporation will be forced
to redeploy its assets in the manner that society has prescribed. It
is this principle which permits full recovery by the corporation even
though some of its present shareholders are the wrongdoers who
caused the misapplication of assets.Y A number of courts have
been troubled by the supposed reward given to wrongdoers in such
suits and because of this have allowed individual recovery. 74 But
the reward to wrongdoers is no greater than the reward to fellow
taxpayers who have encouraged the illegal spending enjoined by a
taxpayer's suit.
When the shareholder derivative suit is viewed as an action to
vindicate the public interest in proper allocation of economic re-
sources, the shareholder possesses standing in its traditional sense.
It is the shareholder who generally has the greatest interest in cor-
porate profit maximization. Since he is normally the beneficiary of
a system which allocates resources according to market demands, he
'
6 8 See M. FkmmREMN, CAPrTAiSM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962); L. JAFFE, supra
note 164, at 4-6.
169 See 5 W. FLETcHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPoRATIONs
§ 2332 (Perm. ed. rev. 1967). Cf. Highlander Folk School v. State, 208 Tenn. 234,
345 S.W.2d 667, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 840 (1961). See also Maddigan, Quo Warranto
to Enforce a Corporate Duty Not to Pollute the Enviro 7ment, 1 ECOLOGY LQ. 653
(1971).
170 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171 Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
172 See H. HENN, supra note 28, § 373. Some cases have, however, allowed re-
covery by individual shareholders. Id.
17 3 See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).
'
7 4 See H. HENN, rupra note 28, § 373.
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is the party with standing to assert that the allocation rules are not
being followed.
At times, however, as when claims of creditors far exceed any
potentially recoverable assets, the shareholder has little interest in
pursuing the corporation's cause of action. At other times as well,
the shareholder's interest may be insufficient to insure that he is the
best qualified party to maintain the suit. For this reason, rules have
been promulgated to eliminate "strike suits."' 1'5  In addition, non-
shareholders have been permitted to vindicate corporate causes of
action when they are the most interested party. Creditors, acting
through trustees or receivers, vindicate such causes of action as a
matter of course.'7  New York General Corporation Law prior to
1963 clearly recognized that an action against corporate directors to
compel them to account for their official conduct 77 was not an ac-
tion in which shareholders alone were interested. It permitted such
an action to be brought "by the attorney general in behalf of the
people of the state ... by the corporation or a creditor, receiver or
trustee in bankruptcy thereof, or by a director or officer of the corpo-
ration."' 78
Now that the shareholder's concern with profit maximization is
no longer coextensive with the public interest in proper resource
allocation, a new method of enforcing societal goals is needed. As
has been shown above, allocation of corporate resources is now
largely controlled by a new federal common law arising from a
broad range of federal regulatory statutes. It is no longer the share-
holder who has the greatest interest in enforcing these rules. 9
Today the worker, the consumer, or members of a larger public have
become more interested in corporate compliance with these new
duties.180 Just as the receiver may have standing to insure proper
175 See generally H. HENN, supra note 28, §§ 361-67, 372.
176 See W. CARY, supra note 29, at 865-66.
177 N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 60(1) (McKinney 1943).
1781d. § 61 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
17 1 am not suggesting that a shareholder no longer has a legitimate interest in se-
curing a return upon his or her investment in the corporation or that a derivative action
should no longer be available to the shareholder to ensure that management's duties to
the corporation are fulfilled. Rather, I am asserting that existing regulation of corpo-
rations, both federal and state, does not have profit maximization as its sole, or even
predominant, thrust, and therefore the shareholder's interest in enforcing these duties
is minimal, if not antithetical to the thrust of the regulations altogether. Thus, these
duties should be enforced by those most interested in enforcement, that is, those indi-
viduals most directly affected by management's misuse of corporate power.
180 The words of Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),
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corporate management of the insolvent corporation, the worker
should have standing to insure corporate compliance with employ-
ment programs. Residents of the affected area may be those most
concerned with insuring that corporate assets are spent for legally
required pollution abatement rather than diverted to shareholders.1 s
When management has decided to act, or not to act, a dissatisfied
member of the public should be able to bring a public interest de-
rivative suit challenging the decision on the grounds that it does not
comport with the federal law of corporate responsibility.1ta
Allowing such individuals to assert their causes of action through
perhaps best capsulize the justification for enlarging the class of individuals to whom
a corporation may be responsible:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a man-
ner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of
the interest he has thus created.
Id. at 126.
While Munn dealt with the constitutionality of state regulation of common carriers,
the evolution of the place of corporations in our society, discussed in the first part of
this article, dictates that corporations also be "clothed with a public interest" and that
control be exercised in part by those most closely affected by corporate decisions.
181The possibility that community members may have conflicting interests-does
not negate the validity of the public interest derivative suit. In this instance, certain
residents may advocate the installation of pollution equipment, while others may depend
upon the corporation as an employer. See text accompanying notes 106-111 supra.
Although it may be impossible to fashion an ideal solution, the public derivative suit
will force the corporation to consider solutions other than violating the pollution laws
or dosing the plant. In this manner, the corporation may better serve the public in-
terest within its goal of profit maximization.
182 Once this suit has been instituted, the directors would be able to defend on the
basis that after reasonable investigation, they had reasonable grounds to believe, and, in
fact, did believe that the decision was consistent with federal standards of corporate
responsibility. See notes 123-24 supra & accompanying text. The reasonable investi-
gation requirement would be satisfied by a showing that the directors had considered
a complete and accurate NEPA-type statement outlining all possible consequences flow-
ing from their decision. See note 120 supra & accompanying text. If the directors
had failed to fulfill this requirement, the court could enjoin the corporation from be-
ginning to implement or further implementing its decision.
The burden would also be upon the directors to meet the second, and more difficult,
requirement of the defense. To do so, they would first have to prove that they exer-
cised due care in considering the spectrum of federally-protected public rights which the
corporation's action might affect, and, based upon the factors considered, there were
reasonable grounds to believe that their decision was consistent with federal standards.
Second, they would have to prove that they did in fact believe that their decision was
reasonable in light of federal policies. The business judgment rule would be available
to protect the directors by preventing the court from substituting its own judgment for
that of the board. Therefore, the business judgment rule would protect directors from
poor business judgments as long as they exercised due care in considering all the rele-
vant factors. If the directors failed to meet this test, the court could hold them per-
sonally liable and order them to choose an alternative consistent with federal standards
of corporate responsibility.
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public interest derivative suits would avoid a number of the prob-
lems present in alternative methods of enforcing corporate social
responsibility. Unlike shareholder enforcement, advocates would
not have conflicting financial interests that might lessen their zeal
for the exercise of corporate responsibility. Unlike administrative
enforcement of accountability, the vagaries of congressional funding
would not interfere with vigorous enforcement efforts. Unlike the
case of minority public interest directors, the courts would have the
power to coerce required changes.
More importantly, however, the proposed remedy may be im-
plemented without further legislative action. Clearly, the corpora-
tion has a cause of action for mismanagement. Just as a corporation
is mismanaged when the directors negligently fail to maximize
profits, so too is it mismanaged when the directors cause the corpo-
ration to violate the law of corporate responsibility. When this mis-
management takes the form of a failure to maximize profits, the
shareholders have a derivative suit to vindicate the corporation's
cause of action. When the mismanagement results in a violation of
the law of corporate responsibility, the public should be able to pur-
sue the corporation's cause of action. Thus, sufficient precedent
exists for immediate judicial validation of the public interest suit.
This feature alone strongly recommends the approach over the more
protracted legislative alternatives which have been suggested.
The public interest derivative suit would allow those most con-
cerned to bring suit upon the corporation's cause of action. As this
suit would be derivative its goal would not be to compensate the
plaintiff for his injury, but rather to require, on behalf of the corpo-
ration, that the corporate management redirect corporate spending
or modify other corporate decisions. The new public interest plain-
tiff would receive no direct recovery or relief. The remedy sought
would benefit the plaintiff only collaterally, as the shareholder was
benefitted collaterally in traditional derivative suits.
Why, though, cast the remedy in the form of a derivative ac-
tion? Would the same result be achieved by implying private rights
of action from various federal regulatory statutes? The derivative
suit possesses a distinct advantage. By limiting enforcement of such
public rights to an action brought on behalf of the corporation, a
multiplicity of suits, with potentially conflicting outcomes, is avoided.
A final judgment precludes relitigation of the same issues since the
only permissible plaintiff - the corporation - is bound by res judi-
cata.
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Federal courts have traditionally been given wide latitude in
shaping remedies for violations of federal law.183 When the cor-
poration is conscripted as a complainant to insure that its officers
and directors do not misdirect its resources, the same latitude should
be allowed. Where directors have failed to consider the social im-
pact of proposed expenditures, directing them to give proper con-
sideration to the relevant factors may be sufficient. In other situa-
tions, enjoining of expenditures or the order of expenditures for
alternative purposes may be needed.
C. Some Lingering Considerations
Several potential objections to the public interest derivative suit
remain. One objection posits that such suits will discourage govern-
mental enforcement of appropriate statutes. Experience indicates,
however, that while there is an interaction between private enforce-
ment and governmental enforcement action, this relationship is by
no means unidirectional. Private litigants may rely upon govern-
mental enforcement efforts to develop the groundwork for their
suits.8 4  Where a private litigant files before the government has
taken any enforcement action, the government may intervene as a
party8 5 or as amicus curiae, 8" rather than bring its own action.
Where the result of litigation imposes burdens upon unsuccessful
defendants which they find unreasonable, they may convince the ap-
propriate regulatory agency to exercise its rule-making power to
ameliorate the results of judicial enforcement. 87 Where private en-
forcement increases operating costs of selected businesses, they may
encourage appropriate governmental officials to undertake industry-
wide regulation in order to remove the competitive disadvantages
resulting from selective enforcement.188  On balance, then, private
183 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
184 Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). For a discussion of the use of
SEC stop order proceedings as a basis for later private suits, see 36 SEC ANN. REp.
34-35 (1970).
185 Clean Air Act § 304(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(c) (2) (1970).
186 See, e.g., 36 SEC ANN. REP. 118-19 (1970).
187 Cf. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 79,108
(Nov. 28, 1972).
188An example is the attempt to formulate a comprehensive program of water
pollution control under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970), rather than permitting selective governmental
enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899. See Justice Department Guidelines of Litiga-
tion Under the Refuse Act, 1 BNA ENvut REP. CUE.tENT DEVEL. 288 (July 17,
1970).
1973]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 294
enforcement often encourages governmental enforcement action be-
yond that which would otherwise be undertaken.
The law of shareholder derivative actions has been obsessed with
the problem of strike suits - actions brought solely to harass the
defendant or for the personal gain of the plaintiffs or their attor-
neys. To prevent such suits, numerous procedural hurdles have
been placed in the way of potential shareholder litigants. These
include the requirement of stock ownership contemporaneous with
the injury, the necessity of exhausting intracorporate remedies
through demands upon directors and shareholders, security-for-ex-
pense statutes when the plaintiff owns a small amount of stock, and
judicial approval of settlements.'89
In considering the necessity for similar restrictions upon public
interest derivative suits, factors unique to corporate shareholders
should be noted. In particular, the ease with which shareholder
status may be acquired is central to the problem of strike suits since
it facilitates the purchasing of standing.' 90 Similarly, the ease with
which shareholders may sell out their interests may justify the im-
position of procedural hurdles. The plaintiff in a public interest
derivative suit is less likely to "litigate a purchased grievance.' 191
In many instances it is difficult to purchase standing. No method is
available without substantial cost or inconvenience to become a cor-
porate employee or a resident of an affected city. Likewise, those
injured by corporate activities may have no simple escape, as does
the shareholder in selling his stock. The homeowner in an area of
air pollution, the consumer of products of an oligopolistic indus-
try,'92 or the unemployed worker has no easy means by which to es-
cape the source of his injury.
Even where public interest standing may be easily purchased -
for example by a consumer of an inexpensive article - other more
effective methods are available to weed out inappropriate represen-
tatives of the public interest. Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger
suggested two tests in Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC.' These are: (1) that the plaintiff be responsible
and representative of the public interest, and (2) that he be willing
189 See generally H. HENN, supra note 28, §§ 361-67, 372, 374.
190 See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L
REV. 1308, 1310 n.8 (1934).
191 Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291,
293 (1950), aft'd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
192 See J. GALBRATH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 208-20 (1967).
193 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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to shoulder the burdens and costs of litigation. 94 These tests could
eliminate potential abuse of the device.
Other reasons underlying the imposition of restrictions on share-
holder litigation may be inappropriate in public interest derivative
suits. While it may be advisable to require shareholders to exhaust
intracorporate remedies in some situations, that alternative may lead
to excessive disruption of corporate life. For example, requiring
labor unions to exhaust the collective bargaining route, perhaps in-
cluding striking over the issue, merely in order to avoid litigation
appears too high a price to pay. Moreover, disruptions and con-
frontations experienced by corporations in recent years reflect the
general absence of reasonable intracorporate channels through
which public interest demands can be made.195
Courts generally permit reimbursement of the successful plain-
tiff for expenses, including attorneys' fees, in a derivative action. 9'
Since the corporation is the real plaintiff in interest, it should bear
the costs of a successful suit in which it has benefited even though
it has been brought in less than willingly as a party.197  The avail-
ability of the corporate treasury as a source of attorneys' fees in the
public interest derivative suit is likely to be the primary stimulus to
the use of the proposed remedy, 98 as experience with private en-
forcement of prohibitions on retention of short swing profits under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act would seem to indi-
cate.199
It may be argued, of course, that the possibility of recovering at-
torneys' fees from the corporation will stir up unnecessary and friv-
olous litigation. As in the case of the traditional shareholder
derivative suit, this contention is usually put forward by those who
194Id. at 1005, cited with approval, Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). Some support for
the public interest derivative suit can be found in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734-35 (1972), which stated that standing would be permitted where an injury was
widely shared so long as the plaintiffs were themselves injured by the challenged action.
In the public interest derivative suit, both the corporation and the individual plaintiffs
would be injured by the improper actions of officers and directors.
195 The confrontation between Eastman Kodak Co. and FIGHT, and that between
students and Dow Chemical Co. are examples of this problem. See S. SEmI, UP
AGAiNsr THE CORPORATE WALL, 107-28, 236-66 (1971). See also, An Activist
Agenda for Annual Meetings, BusINEss WEEK, March 28, 1970, at 45-46.
19 8 See H. HENN, supra note 28, § 377.
197See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362,
363, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
19 8 See W. CARY, supra note 29, at 980-82.
19 9 See Policy Note on Champerty, and Enforcement of Section 16(b), in W. CARY,
supra note 29, at 812-13.
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believe that any litigation which interferes with management's un-
restricted freedom of action is "frivolous." 200  However, only the
successful litigant will be awarded such fees, and then only if the
victory was of benefit to the corporation.2"'
The settlement process may be a valuable tool for obtaining pub-
lic interest objectives quickly and at less cost than would be involved
in full scale litigation." 2 The settlement process may, however, be
abused in two rather different ways. First, corporate management
may find compliant or friendly plaintiffs who will agree to settle the
derivative action - and thus bar further suits on the cause of action
- on terms favorable to corporate management.203 To forestall
such action, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 4 and many state
rules2°5 require judicial approval of any settlement, along with no-
tice to other shareholders of the proposed settlement terms, so that
they may object if they desire.206 The same rules should apply to
the proposed public interest derivative suit. Notice to other poten-
tial plaintiffs of proposed settlement terms could be handled with
the same flexibility as is now done in similar situations in the settle-
ment of class actions.2 0 7
The requirement of judicial approval of settlements has led to
the situation in which potential plaintiffs enter settlements before
filing suit. The settlement demanded by the potential plaintiff may
be extortionate, but corporate management may be willing to pay it
rather than bear the costs of even a successful defense.2 8  Courts
have, however, begun to curb this abuse by considering any such
amount recovered as being held in trust for the corporation and re-
coverable by it, or on its behalf, in a derivative suit.2°° The loss of
the settlement to the corporation is likely to deter those who would
20 0 See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLuM. L
REV. 1, 3 (1947).
2 0 1 Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 279 Minn. 22, 154 N.W.2d 898
(1967).
202 H. HENN, supra note 28, § 374.
20 3 See Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corporation Law, 35 COLUM. L REv. 1167,
1185-89 (1935).
204 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
205 For summary of state rules similar to FED. R. CIrV. P. 23.1, see H. HENN, supra
note 28, § 374, at 790 n.4.
206 See H. HENN, supra note 28, § 374, at 790.
20 7 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e).
208 Cf. W. CARY, supra note 29, at 930-32.
209 See, e.g., Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
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threaten suit merely in order to extort large settlements from poten-
tial defendants.
Many of the relevant federal statutes exempt small business con-
cerns, defined, for example, by number of employees,210 asset size
and number of shareholders,2 11 or sales volume.212  The develop-
ment of a federal common law of corporate responsibility may per-
mit the courts to adapt the policies expressed by the various statutes
to small businesses that were excluded from statutory coverage for
reasons of administrative or enforcement convenience. The courts
should, however, be somewhat hesitant to conclude that no policy
other than convenience of enforcement dictated these small business
exemptions, especially in light of the often expressed congressional
concern for the preservation of small businesses free from costly re-
strictions. 13 Where Congress has excluded small businesses from
statutory coverage in a conscious choice to subordinate the particular
statutory policy to the policy of preserving small business, the
courts should be bound by the coverage limitations imposed by Con-
gress.
V. CONCLUSION
Profit maximization as the exclusive goal of corporate manage-
ment served a social purpose in classical economic theory. It pro-
vided a check on allocation of corporate resources and use of corpo-
rate power. Changing conditions undermined this function, yet the
procedural device for enforcing profit maximization - the share-
holder derivative suit - remained. The federal government has
largely pre-empted the regulation of corporate social responsibility,
giving new direction to the exercise of corporate power. Methods
of enforcing this new responsibility have not been adequately de-
veloped. It is for this purpose that the public interest derivative
suit is proposed.
210 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970),
as amended, Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (Equal Employment
Opportunity).
211 E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
212 E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (Supp. 1972).
213 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1970).
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